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Analysis of Enterprise Behavior Game under the Condition of
Carbon Taxes and New Energy Subsidies
Tang Qi 1,2, Lv Xuhu **
1
School of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, PR China
2
Zaoyang NO.2 High School, Hu Bei PR China
Abstract: In this paper, a dynamic game model of duopoly firms between the traditional electric power enterprises and new
energy enterprises was established for analyzing the behaviors of electric power enterprises under different government
carbon taxes policies and the corresponding Nash equilibrium. This goal of the model was set to maximize the total social
welfare while considering the economic, social and environmental benefit. This model was further used to calculate the
optimal carbon tax rate and optimal government subsidy level for both traditional electric power enterprises and new energy
enterprises. The results showed that a reasonable carbon tax rate and return mode can optimize the structure of Chinese
power industry, encouraging the high-carbon enterprises to reduce emission, promote the development of low carbon
enterprises, and reduce the overall carbon dioxide emission from the power industry.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
With the continuous deterioration of global climate in recent years, ecological environment has become a

matter of the world’s concern. Both domestic and foreign scholars have done research into the effect of
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. Among them, Whalley and Wigle estimated the impact of carbon tax on
global carbon dioxide emissions, suggesting that carbon tax collection could reduce carbon dioxide emissions [1].
Christoph et al. used CGE and studied the change of social welfare in an open economy when there was a
difference in carbon tax [2]; Wang Jinnan et al. argued that a low tax rate could obviously slow down the increase
in CO2 emissions, but it just had a limited effect on China’s macro economy, so it was merely a feasible carbon
tax policy

[3]

. Wei Taoyuan et al. quantitatively analyzed the influence of carbon tax collection on China’s

economy and greenhouse gas emission using China computable general equilibrium (CNACGE) model. When
analyzing international carbon tax design, Michael pointed out that there was a proper unified carbon tax rate
that could realize an emission distribution extremely close to social optimum, and then built a dynamic game
model, concluding that a unified tax rate could help realize a Pareto optimum

[4]

. When studying carbon

tax-based carbon emission reduction, Wolfram et al. held that differentiated carbon taxes should be levied on
production departments. They also presented a condition for the implementation of carbon tax differentiation

[5]

.

Zhang and Baranzini argued that carbon tax rate should be constantly increased with time going by to reflect the
increase in the marginal abatement cost caused by the rise of carbon dioxide content in the atmosphere

[6]

. Li

Huan et al. built a three-phrase model for the game between the government and enterprises, suggesting that
differentiated carbon taxes should be levied in China at the present stage [7].
In conclusion, the research of government policies on carbon emission reduction and carbon tax has drawn
wide attention from the scholars both at home and abroad, and achieved great results. But most of the existing
literatures involve just the effects of carbon taxes on macro-economy, and some quantitatively put forward
suggestions on the determination of a carbon tax rate by building a game model, while very few are focused on
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the carbon tax policies for power sector. According to statistics, among all sectors, the power sector sees the
highest proportion of carbon dioxide emissions nationwide. On the previous studies, by building a three-phase
model for the game between the government, traditional power enterprises and new energy enterprises, this
paper made a discussion on the power enterprises’ countermeasures against the carbon tax policy, as well as the
carbon tax rate and subsidies made by the government, providing theoretical suggestions and data support for
the formulation of government policies on carbon taxation.
2.

BUILDING OF A CARBON TAX POLICY-BASED GAME MODEL FOR ENTERPRISE
BEHAVIOR

CHOICES

It is assumed in this model that the participants include the government department that participates in the
setting of carbon tax rate and two representative power enterprises (Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2), of which
Enterprise 1 represents the traditional power enterprises that use coal as the main fuel, while Enterprise 2
represents the new energy enterprises that adopt photovoltaic material, hydroelectricity or nuclear power as the
main fuel. And then a dynamic game model [8] is established, aimed at researching the optimal decision problem
of the power system consisting of the government departments and duopoly firms.
In particular, there are two optional government policies for carbon tax collection and subsidy distribution:
1) levying a carbon tax on the traditional power enterprises, while subsidizing the new energy enterprises, called
tax and subsidy model for short;

2) levying a carbon tax on the traditional power enterprises, which also

actively develop emission reduction technologies, while the new energy enterprises aren’t subsidized, called
subsidy-free tax collection & emission reduction model for short. The following is a comparative analysis on the
game behavior orientations and results growing out of both policies.
2.1 Variable and Parameter Setting
⑴ enterprise 1 and enterprise 2 form a duopolistic power market. Suppose the gross output q of the power
sector exactly

meets the market demand, and power price is denoted by inverse demand

function p(Q )  a  bQ(a  0,b  0). Where, a denotes a ceiling price acceptable to the market, and qi denotes
the production of enterprise i, then Q 

2

 qi .
i
1

⑵ Suppose the average production cost of per unit product is ci(i  1,2), since new energy enterprises have
to import key production components, and that the operation and maintenance cost is high, c 1  c 2 .
⑶ There are differences in carbon emission between both types of power enterprises. Suppose Enterprise i
emits ei of carbon dioxide per unit product, since the production in the new energy enterprise is characterized by
cleanness and environmental protection, e1  e2 , Enterprise I emits ei qi of carbon dioxide in practical production.
⑷ The government levies a carbon tax on enterprises according to quantity. Suppose carbon tax at t yuan is
levied per unit carbon emission.
⑸ The amount of loss caused by carbon dioxide emission can be denoted by environmental damage
function U e . See Literature
as U e 

[9]

k (e1q1  e2 q 2 )
, where k
2
2

for the details of the damage function, which can be assumed

 0 , representing the degree of the state’s attention to climate.

⑹ A simplified model is set up for new energy enterprises owing to the very low carbon emission.
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Let e2  0 in all the following model solutions.
⑺ Considering the high initial investment cost and long payoff period for Enterprise 2, the government
gives it financial subsidies in accordance with its fixed output. Suppose s yuan is given to Enterprise 2 for per
unit of product.
2.2 Three-phase Dynamic Taxation & Subsidy Model and Analyses
2.2.1 Model Building
The cost function for Enterprise 1:

C 1  c1q1  te1q1

Profit function:

11  (a  bq1  bq2 )q1  c1q1  te1q1
The cost function for Enterprise 2:

(1)

C 2  c2q2  sq2

Profit function:

12  (a  bq1  bq2 )q2  c2q2  sq2

(2)

The social total welfare function U in this paper is comprised of power enterprise profit, consumer surplus,
carbon tax revenue, subsidy loss, and the environmental loss caused by carbon emission. Function U is shown as
follows:

U 1   11   12  U 0  te1q1  sq1  U e
1
1
 (a  bq1  bq 2  c1 )q1  (a  bq1  bq 2  c2 )q 2  b(q1  q 2 )2  k(e1q 1)2
2
2
1
1
 (a  c1 )q1  (a  c2 )q 2  b(q1  q 2 )2  k(e1q1 )2
2
2

(3)

2.2.2 Model Analysis
Converse solution method is adopted since this model is built on complete information hypothesis.
Step 1: as a follower, the new energy enterprise chooses an optimal output level for itself
Take the derivative of q2 by (2) and get:

Let

 12
q 2

12
 a  bq1  2bq 2  c2  s
q 2

 0 and get that when Enterprise 1 chooses q1 , Enterprise 2 actually selects

s2 (q2 ) 

a  c2  bq1  s
2b

s2 (q2 )
(4)

Take the derivative of Formula (2-4), identifying the influence of the output of Enterprise 1 and the
amount of subsidies on Enterprise 2.

q 2
q 1

 0,

q 2
s

 0

(5)

Conclusion: The distribution of subsidies leads to an increase in the output of Enterprise 2, and thus encourages
Enterprise 2 to develop, to achieve the goal of optimizing the industrial structure. The output of
Enterprise 2 decreases with the output of Enterprise 1 increasing, and this is the inevitable
outcome of oligarch competition in the market.
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Step 2: as a leader, the traditional power enterprise selects an optimal output level for itself at a given tax rate
level and subsidy level
Substitute (4) into (1) and identify the profit made by Enterprise 1:
11 

a  c2  2c1  2te1  s
b
q1  q12
2
2

Take the derivative of q1 and get:

11
a  2bq1  (c2  2c1 )  2e1t  s

q1
2
q1 

a  (c2  2c1 )  2e1t  s
2b

(6)

Meanwhile substitute (6) into (4) and get:

q2 

a  (2c1  3c2 )  2e1t  3s
4b

(7)

Take the derivative of (7) and identify the effect of carbon taxation and subsidy level on Enterprise 1.

q 1
t

 0,

q 1
s

 0

(8)

Conclusion: The introduction of carbon taxes and subsidies reduces the output of Enterprise 1, and this will
help control carbon emissions in the power sector, so as to urge the traditional power enterprises to
further reduce emissions.
Step 3: the government levies a carbon tax on the power enterprise at the rate of t * and subsidizes the new
energy enterprise at the level of s*
Take the derivative of t by (3) and get:
U 1
q
q
(q  q )
q
 (a  c1 ) 1  (a  c2 ) 2  b(q1  q2 ) 1 2  ke12q1 1
t
t
t
t
t

Then, take the derivative of s by (2-3) and get:
U 1
q
q
(q  q2 )
q
 (a  c1 ) 1  (a  c2 ) 2  b(q1  q2 ) 1
 ke12q1 1
s
s
s
s
s

The optimum carbon tax rate t * and subsidy level s* should satisfy condition
*

t1 

(c2  c1 )(2ke12  b )
3
1

2ke

*
, s  (a  c 2 ) 

b(c 2  c1 )
ke12

(9)

Conclusion: Carbon tax rate is positively correlated to the cost of power generation by the new energy
enterprise and traditional power enterprise, as well as to the subsidies to new energy enterprise and
the carbon emission intensity in Enterprise 1.
2.3 Subsidy-free Tax Collection & Emission Reduction Model and Analyses
2.3.1Model Building
On the premise of model hypothesis in 2.1, Enterprise 1 actively introduces emission reduction equipment
and technology to purify carbon dioxide emissions. At this point, Enterprise 2 is not subsidized. Let emission
purification level be r , which represents the decrement in carbon emission after the purification of per unit
emission. Suppose the cost of purification treatment equals c(r ) at purification level r , c(r ) is a monotonic
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increasing concave function. Refer to Literature

and let c(r ) 
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r
, where,  denotes purification
1 r

cost coefficient, and is affected by the emission reduction technology adopted at that time.
The profit function for Enterprise 1:

12  (a  bq1  bq2 )q1  c1q1 

r
e1q1  t(1  r )e1q1
1r

(10)

The profit function for Enterprise 2:

 22  (a  bq1  bq 2 )q 2  c2q 2
The social welfare function:

U 2  12   22  U 0  t(1  r )e1q1  U e
r
 (a  c1 
e1 )q1  (a  c2 )q 2
1  r


(11)

1
1
b(q1  q 2 )2 
k(1  r )2(e1q1 )2
2
2

2.3.2 Model Analysis
Three-phase dynamic analysis is adopted for model analysis.
Step 1: as a follower, the new energy enterprise chooses an optimal output level for itself
Take the derivative of q2 by (11) and get:

 22
 a  bq1  2bq 2  c2
q 2
Let

 22
q 2

 0 and conclude that when Enterprise 1 selects q1 , Enterprise 2 actually chooses s2 (q2 )

s2 (q2 ) 

a  c2  bq1
2b

Take the derivative of Formula (12),

(12)

q 2
q 1

 0

Conclusion: The output of Enterprise 2 is merely related to the output of Enterprise 1, and decreases with the
output of Enterprise 1 increasing.
Step 2: as a leader, the traditional power enterprise selects an optimal output level for itself at a given tax rate
level and

subsidy level.

Take the derivative of r by Formula (10) and get:

12

 
e1q1  te1q1
r
(1  r )2
Let

 12
r

(13)

 0 and get: r  1 

Take the derivative of Formula（13) ,


t

dr
 0,
dt

Conclusion: With carbon tax rate increasing, the enterprises become more proactive in reducing emissions, but
acceleration drops off.
Then substitute (12) and (10) into (10), revealing the profit of Enterprise:
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12  [

a  c2  2c1
b
 (2 t   )e1]q1  q12
2
2

Take the derivative of F q1 in the above formula and get:

12
a  c2  2c1

 (2 t   )e1  bq1
q1
2
Let

 12
q 1

 0 and get: q1 

a  c 2  2c1  2e1 (2 t   )
2b

(14)

Then substitute (2-14) into (2-12) and get:

a  2c1  3c 2  2e1 (2 t   )
(15)
4b
q1
Take the derivative of (15)
 0,
t
Conclusion: The introduction of carbon tax decreases the output of Enterprise 1, and this will help control
q2 

carbon emissions in the power sector, so as to urge the traditional power enterprises to further
reduce emissions.
Step 3: the government levies a carbon tax on the power enterprise at the rate of t *
Substitute (13) into (11) and get the following social total welfare function:

U 2  (a  c1  t e1  e1 )q1  (a  c2 )q2 

1

b(q1  q2 )2  k(e1q1 )2
2
2t

The optimum carbon tax rate satisfies:

t *  arg Max U 2

(16)

t

3.

DATE SIMULATION ANALYSIS

3.1 Parameter Estimation
The related data of power enterprises’ cost, demand, emission, and loss function comes mainly from the
relevant data of Chinese power sector in 2014. (1) The average cost of 1kwh power, including that in traditional
power enterprises and new energy enterprises, is calculated. (2) The inverted demand curve of power products is
estimated according to domestic research achievements

[11]

, denoted by p  1.5  0.004Q .(3) According to the

data of carbon emission recorded in China Energy Statistical Yearbook, the traditional power enterprises emit
0.96 kg of carbon when producing 1kwh power, namely e1  0.96 . (4) Refer to foreign research achievements [9]
and let pollution loss coefficient k  0.005 .
3.2 Numerical Simulation Result and Analysis
Suppose the purification cost coefficient  of Enterprise 1 is a constant, let   0.2 . In Model 2, since
purification level r  0 , t  0.2 . By reference to the policies implemented by the countries in which a carbon
tax has begun to be collected, considering China’s concrete national conditions, here the initial value of carbon
tax rate is set equal to 0.2, and increases gradually. The enterprise’s production decision, social welfare and
equilibrium outcome are shown as follows.
Table 1. The Optimum Carbon Tax Rate in Model 1
Carbon Tax Rate

t 1 (yuan/kg co 2 )
0.118

Subsidy s
(yuan/kg co 2 )
0.826

q1
43.43

q2
206.535

CO2 Emissions
(Ten THS Tons)
416.93

1

2

U1

3.766

170.598

166.078
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Table 2. The Influence of Changes in Carbon Tax Rate

t2

r

q1

q2

127

61.5

1

2

U2

1219.20

32.258

15.129

105.674

CO2 Emissions
(Ten THS Tons)

0.20

0

0.22

0.047

122.314

63.843

1119.57

29.922

16.304

108.829

0.24

0.087

117.837

66.081

1032.67

27.771

17.467

111.014

0.26

0.123

113.543

68.228

956.01

25.784

18.620

112.494

0.28

0.155

109.411

70.294

887.71

23.942

19.765

113.450

0.30

0.184

105.424

72.288

826.36

22.229

20.902

114.013

0.32

0.209

101.569

74.216

770.85

20.632

22.032

114.276

0.33

0.222

99.686

75.157

745.01

19.875

22.594

114.318

0.34

0.233

97.831

76.084

720.31

19.142

23.155

114.310

0.36

0.254

94.202

77.899

674.06

17.748

24.273

114.166

0.38

0.275

90.673

79.663

631.50

16.443

25.385

113.885

0.40

0.293

87.235

81.382

592.17

15.220

26.492

113.496

----

----

125.042

----

----

62.542

93.7343


1.08

From Table we can get:
(1) With carbon tax t increasing, the social total welfare function first increases and then decreases. With carbon
tax t increasing, the output of Enterprise 1 keeps decreasing, and when t  1.08 , Enterprise 1 stops
production. Enterprise constantly increases its output, and Enterprise 1 earns an increasingly lower profit,
while Enterprise 2 sees an increase in its profit.
(2) With carbon tax t increasing, carbon emission drops off, suggesting that an increase in carbon tax rate can
effectively reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the power sector. But with carbon tax t increasing, the
purification level of Enterprise 1 increases slowly, and thus it becomes less proactive in reducing emissions.
(3) Whent 2
4.

 t1 , the carbon tax rate in Model 2 is higher than that in Model 1.

CONCLUSIONS
On the premise of carbon tax collection, for the decision-making behaviors of the government and power

enterprises, this paper built an oligarchic game and competition model, and quantitatively analyzed the optimal
decisions respectively made by the government and enterprises, identifying an optimum carbon tax rate and an
optimum output, with a numerical simulation conducted on them. It then compared the optimal decisions under
these two models, coming to the following conclusions:
First, when the state levies a carbon tax, for a traditional power enterprise, being proactive in reducing
emissions is the best measure. So, the government should make a proper carbon tax policy, and then on the
premise of guaranteeing social total welfare optimization, encourage and instruct the traditional power
enterprises to purify carbon emissions to enhance their market competitiveness.
Second, for a new energy enterprise, it can maximize its profit when it’s subsidized by the government. But
Enterprise 2 cannot supply electricity steadily or bid for electric network easily. Its high cost at present cannot
enable it to replace Enterprise 1 in spite of subsidies. So, the government should set a rational carbon tax rate
and then steer the power sector in a low-carbon direction.
Third, currently, power sector has become China’s largest source of carbon dioxide emissions, since Chinese
power generation structure is dominated by coal, while new energy just occupies a very small proportion.
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Therefore, the power generation structure must be optimized. To this end, we must encourage the production of
new energy, and meanwhile strengthen the efforts to reduce emissions in the traditional power enterprises.
Fourth, an analysis based on the practical situation indicates that to achieve the emission reduction target,
the government usually tends to directly subsidize clean energy enterprises in the short term, but this practice
will dampen the traditional power enterprises’ enthusiasm for emission reduction, and thus undermine the
stability of the power sector. For long-term steady development of the power sector, the government needs to set
a rational carbon tax rate to support high-carbon enterprises in emission reduction, and encourage new energy
enterprises to develop.
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